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I. INTRODUCTION
"One person, one vote" sounds like a simple mathematical
equation. Actually, it isn't quite that easy, but over the last forty
years, the Supreme Court has distilled a fairly stable and predictable
test for resolving the basic issue of equal representation: how much
population difference between districts is permissible?
In one area of representation, however, the Court has gotten
the math wrong. In its only opinion on the decennial apportionment of
Congress, the 1992 case U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana,1
the Court punted. Rather than apply its well-established test from
the districting cases, the Court deferred to Congress on the ground
that different ways of measuring equality of representation produced
different apportionments, and thus Congress, rather than the Court,
should choose the best measure. 2 Unfortunately, that conclusion was
based on a mathematical error.
As an abstract matter, applying the districting test to
apportionment makes sense. Apportionment and districting are
opposite sides of the same coin. In districting, one has a fixed number
of representatives, and the geographic area must be cut into pieces to
accommodate them. In apportionment, the geographic area is already
divided into states, and the representatives must be parceled out
among the divisions. In both instances, the goal is "equal
representation for equal numbers of people."3 In both instances, the
same test should apply.
But when the Court tried to apply the districting test to
apportionment, it was misled by its mathematical mistake. Relying
on numbers provided by the parties, the Court thought it was looking
at a calculation of relative deviation-the test used in the districting
cases-when it was not.4  Instead, it was looking at a different
computation, and, not surprisingly, this alternative computation
produced results that conflicted with other indications the Court had.5
The Court thus concluded that the relative deviation test could not be
applied to apportionment because the results that the Court reached
1. 503 U.S. 442, 445 (1992).
2. Id. at 464-66.
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
4. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 461-62.
5. Id. at 462-63.
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under the test sent mixed signals about the appropriate measure of
representation.
6
This Article does the mathematics correctly. It provides a
unified account of "one person, one vote" for both the districting cases
and the apportionment of Congress, explaining why the same measure
of "one person, one vote"-relative deviation-should apply to both
districting and apportionment. I argue that the Court may be
constitutionally required to apply this test in the apportionment
context, and I demonstrate the method of finding the apportionment
that best satisfies the requirement.
The apportionment method that best satisfies the "one person,
one vote" test is unlike any method previously in use. Calculated
under this method, the current Congress would have three fewer
representatives from California and one more from each of South
Dakota, Delaware, and Montana. In general, larger states lose
representatives and smaller states gain.
Part II describes the evolution of the "one person, one vote"
standard for districting cases. Part III relates the history of
apportionment of the House and examines the sole Supreme Court
case on the requirements of apportionment. In particular, this Part
shows how an arithmetic error caused the Court's confusion about how
to measure compliance with "one person, one vote" in the
apportionment context. Having established a clear foundation, Part
IV sets forth the prima facie case that the current apportionment of
the House is out of compliance with the "one person, one vote" test
from the districting cases. Part IV also considers possible
counterarguments and concludes that they are not persuasive.
This does not end the inquiry, however, since under the "one
person, one vote" test, the government has the opportunity to
demonstrate that the current apportionment serves a legitimate
political interest. Such a defense relies on technical properties of
apportionments, and so I begin Part V with a discussion of the various
methods of apportionment, including the new method that I propose.
After laying the groundwork, I show that the legitimate government
interests that support apportionment do not support the use of the
current method of apportionment over my proposed method. In Part
VI, I outline some of the political consequences that would result from





A. Developing the Tests
Over time, the Supreme Court settled on two tests for
measuring representation: total deviation and average deviation.
While average deviation is employed to assess a few types of
districting plans, the Court has shown a strong preference for using
total deviation, even applying it to circumstances that do not quite fit.
When the Court initiated the reapportionment revolution with
its "one person, one vote"7 pronouncements in Gray v. Sanders,8
Reynolds v. Sims,9 and Wesberry v. Sanders,10 it had little need for a
refined statistic to measure the deviation from equal district sizes.
The disparities were so egregious that any (and all) measures sufficed
to demonstrate the inequities. Thus, in these early cases the Court
gave a laundry list of figures and statistics to capture the disparities,
including population-variance ratios,11 percentage of the population
residing in a majority of the Senate districts, 12 and specific instances
of malapportionment. 13
As time passed and state and local governments adjusted their
districting, this ad hoc approach to measuring adherence to "one
person, one vote" proved insufficient. The Court could have required
exact equality among the districts, and to some extent this is what it
ultimately did in the case of congressional districts.14 In the case of
state and local districting, however, the Court was loathe to require
such strict adherence to mathematical equality. Instead, it chose to
provide guidance as to the proper measure of "one person, one vote,"
7. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 384 (1963).
8. Id.
9. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
10. 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545 ("Population-variance ratios of up to about 41-to-1
existed in the Senate, and up to about 16-to-1 in the House."); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7 ("A single
Congressman represents from two to three times as many Fifth District voters as are
represented by each of the Congressmen from each of the other Georgia congressional districts.").
12. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545.
13. Id. at 549 ("Even so, serious disparities from a population-based standard remained.
Montgomery County, with 169,210 people, was given only four seats, while Coosa County, with a
population of only 10,726, and Cleburne County, with only 10,911, were each allocated one
representative.").
14. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983) ('We thus reaffirm that there are no de
minimis population variations, which could practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet
the standard of Art. I, § 2 without justification."). But, as we will see, even in these cases the
Court invoked measures of disparity in its analysis.
300 [Vol. 59:2:297
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and the maximum discrepancies allowed. The Court ultimately
adopted the measure of total deviation.
To understand the total deviation measure, consider Abate v.
Mundt.15 The Rockland County Board of Supervisors consisted of
representatives of the five towns in the county: Stony Point,
Haverstraw, Orangetown, Clarkstown, and Ramapo. 16 In order to
comply with the "one person, one vote" mandate, the number of
representatives elected from each town differed depending on the size
of the town. 17 For example, Ramapo, the largest town, was given 6
representatives and Stony Point, the smallest, was given 1. The
towns, their populations, and the number of their representatives are
shown in the first three columns of Table 1.18
Table I
Town Popu- Repre- People/ Relative Total
lation sentatives Repre- Deviation Deviation
sentative
Stony Point 12114 1 12114 -0.34
Haverstraw 23676 2 11838 -2.61
Orangetown 52080 4 13020 7.11
Clarkstown 57883 5 11576.6 -4.76
Ramapo 73051 6 12175.17 0.16
Rockland 218804 18 12155.78 11.88
County
For each town we compute the number of people per
representative by simple division. We also compute the ideal district
size (the bottom cell in the fourth column) by dividing the total
population of the county by the total number of representatives on the
county board. For each city, then, we can compute the relative
deviation from the ideal district size (column five) by taking the
difference between the city's number of people per representative and
the ideal district size, dividing by the ideal district size, and
15. 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971).
16. Id. at 184 n.1.
17. Id. at 184.
18. Id. at 184 n.1.
2006]
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multiplying by 100 (to turn it into a percentage). 19 The relative
deviation is the difference between the size of the town's average
district and the ideal district expressed as a percentage of the ideal
district. Finally, we compute the size of the interval between the
largest relative deviation and the smallest to get the total deviation.
20
Abate was not the first case to apply the total deviation
measure. Several years earlier, in Swann v. Adams, the Court
confronted a challenge to a districting of the Florida state
legislature. 21  Total deviation appears in the company of other
statistics:
The senate districts range from 87,595 to 114,053 in population per senator, or from
15.09% overrepresented to 10.56% underrepresented. The ratio between the largest and
the smallest district is thus 1.30 to 1. The deviation from the average population per
senator is greater than 15% in one senatorial district, is greater than 14% in five more
districts and is more than 10% in still six other disricts.
2 2
The Court again utilized the total deviation measure in Wells v.
Rockefeller,23  a challenge to a New York state congressional
redistricting in which the Appendix computes the relative deviation
for each district and lists the maximum and minimum of those
numbers. 24 After Abate, the Court applied the total deviation measure
in Mahan v. Howell,25 a challenge to the reapportionment of the
Virginia House of Delegates. In this case, the Court acknowledged
total deviation as a primary measure of compliance with "one person,
one vote": "In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and Wells v. Rockefeller, this
Court invalidated state reapportionment statutes for federal
19. So, for instance, Haverstraw has 11,838 people per representative, so its percent
deviation from the ideal district size is 100 x (11,838-12,155.78)/12,155.78 = -2.614. The negative
sign indicates that the town has a smaller people-to-representative ratio than the ideal, i.e., the
citizens of Haverstraw are over-represented.
20. In this case the largest percent deviation is 7.11% for Orangetown, and the smallest is -
4.76% for Clarkstown, making the total deviation 7.11% + 4.76% = 11.88%. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Board in spite of the size of the total deviation based on:
[The] long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in Rockland County
government and on the fact that the plan before us does not contain a built-in bias
tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas. And nothing we say
today should be taken to imply that even these factors could justify substantially
greater deviations from population equality.
Abate, 403 U.S. at 187.
21. 385 U.S. 440, 441 (1967).
22. Id. at 442. The Court struck down this apportionment as being in violation of "one
person, one vote." Id. at 443-44.
23. 394 U.S. 542, 547 (1969).
24. Id. As the Court does not rely on the total deviation test for challenges to congressional
districting, it is especially telling that the Court decided to include this calculation in its
Appendix.
25. 410 U.S. 315, 320 (1973).
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congressional districts having maximum percentage deviations of
5.97% and 13.1% respectively. The express purpose of these cases was
to elucidate the standard first announced in the holding of Wesberry v.
Sanders."
26
These cases developed a principle of prima facie compliance
with "one person, one vote." For congressional districts the rule is
that no deviation from absolute equality in district size is considered
de minimis, and every deviation has to be justified by some legitimate
state interest.27 The Court has yet to find an interest sufficient to
justify any deviation.
28
The Court has distinguished state districting. In Connor v.
Finch, the Court found that a total deviation of less than 10% would
be considered de minimis for legislatively enacted apportionments of
state legislatures. 29 A larger deviation "could be justified only if it
were 'based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of
a rational state policy."'30 The Court restated this rule in Brown v.
Thompson.3
1
Occasionally, the Court employs another measure of
representation in an auxiliary role to total deviation. The average
deviation (sometimes known as the mean deviation) is the average of
the absolute value of the relative deviation from the ideal district size.
For example, in the Rockland County Board of Supervisors discussed
earlier, the relative deviations are -0.34, -2.61, 7.11, -4.76, and 0.1632
and so the average of their absolute values is
(0.34+2.61+7.11+4.76+0.16)/5=3.00. The average deviation has never
been used as the primary means of deciding compliance with "one
person, one vote," but rather as a complementary factor.
The Court used average deviation in two early cases before it
settled on the 10% total deviation standard. In White v. Regester, a
challenge to a redistricting of the Texas House of Representatives, the
26. Id.; see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1969) (rejecting a
congressional districting plan for Missouri on the basis of "one person, one vote").
27. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983).
28. Id. at 734.
29. 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977).
30. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
31. 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) ("Our decisions have established as a general matter, that an
apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within the category
of minor deviations."). But see Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (N. D. Ga. 2004), affd,
542 U.S. 947 (2004) (finding a Georgia districting plan with total deviation of 9.98% in violation
of "one person, one vote" because the deviation was due to a partisan gerrymander). What this
portends for the 10% safe harbor is unclear. See, e.g., Postings of Richard Hasen and Richard
Pildes to Election Law Blog, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/2004_06.html (June 30, 2004)
(discussing the possible effects of the Larios decision).
32. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 n.1 (1971).
2006]
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total deviation of the proposed redistricting was 9.9%, but the average
deviation was only 1.82%. 33 Because few of the districts had large
relative deviations, the Court was "unable to conclude from these
deviations alone that appellees satisfied the threshold requirement of
proving a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause."3 4  Similarly, in Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court
rejected a challenge to a districting plan with a total deviation of 7.8%
in the House and 1.8% in the Senate, noting that the mean deviations
were only 1.9% and 0.45% respectively. 35 However, since the Court
later determined that a total deviation of less than 10% was de
minimis, it is hard to know how important a role average deviation
played in these two cases.
A situation in which average deviation may take precedence
over total deviation is when a court is choosing among districting
plans that all have small total deviations. In this circumstance, a
court is not bound to choose the one with the smallest total deviation,
but can consider the average deviation as well. For example, in
Fletcher v. Golder, the Court was deciding among four districting
plans for St. Louis County.36 The four plans had total deviations of
1.12, 1.15, 1.15, and 1.13%, with average deviations of 0.42, 0.29, 0.32,
and 0.31% respectively.37 The Court ruled that it was not obligated to
choose the plan with the smallest total deviation (1.12%), but could
choose the one with a slightly higher total deviation but smaller
average deviation (1.13% and 0.31%).38 So, at least for small levels
and small differences in total deviation, average deviation may be a
deciding factor. Nevertheless, the cases make clear that the most
important statistic in measuring "one person, one vote" is total
deviation. 39
33. 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973).
34. Id. at 764.
35. 412 U.S. 735, 737 (1973).
36. 959 F.2d 106, 107-08 (8th Cir. 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 109.
39. That total deviation and average deviation are the only measures of significance is
widely accepted. Bernard Grofman notes that "[t]he most common measures of population
equality are the total deviation (also known as the overall population range) and the average
deviation (also known a mean deviation)." Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social
Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 81-82 (1985). He only goes on to cite two cases in which
average deviation played a role: White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 33-34, and Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1984). In Holmes, a Rhode
Island House districting plan had a total deviation of 11.5% but an average deviation of only
1.9%. 475 A.2d at 979. The total deviation was significantly increased by two outlier districts,
and if those districts were taken out of the calculation the total deviation of the plan was only
5.4%. Id. The aberrant two districts were found to have such a large deviation because of a
[Vol. 59:2:297304
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That the Court prefers the total deviation measure is evident
from its application of that measure even in situations where it does
not quite fit. Consider Board of Estimate v. Morris.40 The New York
City Board of Estimate was composed of three officials who were
elected at-large (the mayor, the comptroller, and the city council
president) as well as the presidents of each of the five boroughs of New
York City.41 The three at-large members of the Board each cast two
votes, and the presidents of the boroughs each cast one vote. 42 Six
votes were needed to pass a resolution.43 Registered voters from
Brooklyn (the most populous borough with 2,230,936 residents) filed
suit, claiming that the structure of the Board violated the "one person,
one vote" requirement because they had the same representation as
the borough of Staten Island (with a population of 352,151).
44
After rejecting a more technical game-theoretic analysis, 45 the
Court decided to apply the total deviation measure. For the purpose of
its analysis, the Court viewed the Board of Estimate as consisting of
11 representatives, 6 elected at-large (corresponding to the 6 votes
distributed among the 3 at-large representatives) and 5 elected from
the boroughs. 46 To measure the amount of representation provided to
each citizen, the Court allocated the six votes associated with the at-
large representatives to the various boroughs on a proportional
basis.47 That is, since Brooklyn represented 31% of the population of
"mathematical error" of an unspecified nature. Id. The court found that the two anomalous
districts had to be redistricted but upheld the rest of the plan. Id. at 988. The average deviation
statistic seems to have played no role in the decision.
The National Council of State Legislatures provides a primer on election law in which they
discuss measuring "one person, one vote." See Ellen Tewes & Paige Seals, Equal Population, in
REDISTRICTING LAW 2000 (1999), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/
scr/redist/red2000/ch2equal.htm. According to their survey, the total deviation is "the most
commonly used measure of population equality," but they, too, discuss the average deviation. Id.
They cite only Gaffney and White as examples in which the average deviation played a role. Id.
40. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
41. Id. at 694.
42. Id.
43. The voting rule was somewhat different for budgetary matters. In those cases the mayor
did not participate in the vote. The Court did not worry about the difference in the two types of
votes, focusing on the more general structure described above. Id. at 698.
44. Id. at 700 n.7.
45. See Paul H. Edelman, Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A Mathematical
Appraisal of At-Large Representation, 4 ELECTION L. J. 258, 273 (2005) (discussing how Justice
Harlan dismissed the game theoretic analysis as too sensitive to slight shifts in the political
situation); DAN S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHE MACHOVER, THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER,
THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES 114 (1998) (discussing Justice Harlan's
dismissal of the Banzhaf theory in Morris and the broader issue of the Court's continued
dismissal of the game theoretic proposal).
46. Morris, 489 U.S. at 694.
47. Id. at 700-02.
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New York, the citizens of Brooklyn were thought to have 31% of the 6
at-large votes (1.89) as part of their representation. 48 Thus, Brooklyn
was considered to have 2.89 representatives. In a similar fashion,
Staten Island (with 4.9% of the population)49 was thought to have an
extra 0.29 share of a representative above its own single
representative. For each borough, the Court computed the quotient of
population to total representatives and then looked for the total
deviation from an apportionment in which all the boroughs were of
equal size. 50  It calculated the total deviation as 78%.51 This total
deviation was well beyond what had been previously considered
acceptable, so the Court found the Board in violation of the "one
person, one vote" criterion.
52
The difficulty with the Court's analysis is that it is not
consistent with the weighted voting nature of the Board. To see this
most clearly, imagine a different board in which there is a single at-
large representative with a weighted vote of 6 and one representative
from each borough with a weighted vote of 1. Since 6 votes will carry
a resolution, the only vote that matters is the at-large representative.
Should we conclude that "one person, one vote" is satisfied since the
at-large representative was representing all the citizens of New York
equally? It would seem so, yet the Court's analysis would still lead to
the conclusion that the citizens of Brooklyn are underrepresented. A
single at-large voter with a weighted vote of 6 would have his 6 votes
allocated proportionally to the various boroughs in the exact same
proportions as the 3 at-large voters who had weighted votes of 2. 53
The resulting total deviation is the exact same 78%. Whether or not
one finds the Court's analysis persuasive, its application of the total
deviation yardstick is significant. When faced with an unusual,
difficult to analyze voting scheme, the Court continued to reach for its
48. Id. at 700 n.7.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 702 n.9.
51. For example, Brooklyn had 2,230,936/2.89 = 771,143 people per representative. Since
the total population of New York was 7,071,030, the average number of people per representative
overall is 7,071,030/11 = 642,820. The relative deviation of Brooklyn from this average is 19.96%.
A similar calculation shows that Staten Island deviates from this average by -57.82%; therefore,
the total deviation of the plan is 77.8%. These calculations are not explicit in the opinion.
Apparently the idea of measuring representation in this fashion was raised in the district court
but not on appeal. Note, however, that the Justices raised it during oral argument before the
Court. Id.
52. Id. at 702.
53. This is because the Court allocated the total number of at-large votes among the
boroughs and was unconcerned as to how those votes were distributed among the at-large
representatives.
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tried-and-true measure of total deviation, even if it had to stretch the
concepts to make it fit.
A somewhat less dramatic but equally important example of
the Court's eagerness to apply the total deviation measure is Karcher
v. Daggett.54 In Karcher, the Court held that there was no de minimis
level of deviation from strict numeric equality in congressional
districting.55  Any deviation from perfect equality of district size
(within a state) had to be justified.56 Given the rigor of this holding,
there would seem to be little reason to choose any particular measure
of disparity: unequal districts are unequal no matter how they are
measured.
Nevertheless, the Court decided the case in the language of
total deviation. "The largest district, the Fourth District, which
includes Trenton, had a population of 527,472 and the smallest, the
Sixth District, embracing most of Middlesex County, a population of
523,798. The difference between them was 3,674 people, or 0.6984% of
the average district."57 The challenged plan was contrasted with one
which "had a maximum population difference of 2,375 or 0.4514% of
the average figure."58  Finally, in explaining why it did not want to
start down a slippery slope by allowing some de minimis deviation, the
Court observed, "In this case, appellants argue that a maximum
deviation of approximately 0.7% should be considered de minimis. If
we accept that argument, how are we to regard deviations of 0.8%,
0.95%, 1% or 1.1%?" 59 Thus, even in a situation in which the Court
could avoid choosing a particular standard, it effectively chose total
deviation. 6
0
B. Evaluating the Tests
It would have been nice if somewhere along its jurisprudential
path the Court had forthrightly considered whether total deviation is
the most appropriate measure of deviation from perfect districting. It
resisted doing so even in the face of dissents criticizing the majority on
54. 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983).
55. Id. at 734.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 728. It may not be immediately clear but a simple algebraic computation will
show that, in the case of single-member districts, total deviation can be calculated by taking the
difference between the most populous and the least populous districts and dividing by the size of
the ideal district. So the Court is asserting here that the total deviation is 0.6984%.
58. Id. at 729.
59. Id. at 732.
60. To be fair, the Court does mention the average district size once, id. at 728, but that is
its only acknowledgement of the concept.
20061 307
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exactly this point.61 Measures other than total deviation are certainly
plausible; the standard deviation of the district sizes is a natural
measure that apparently was never considered. There has been, over
the years, a lively discussion in political science literature about what
the best measure of "one person, one vote" is.62 But the Court has
never commented on its choice. This Section speculates on why the
Court may have chosen total deviation as the appropriate measure.
First, it is helpful to clarify the two distinct choices the Court
has made in deciding how to measure "one person, one vote." The first
is the quantity that should be equal across districts. Even in this most
basic decision, the Court has been less than forthright. Although
there is little doubt that total population per representative is the
correct measure for congressional districts, the Court has never quite
held as such. 63  Nevertheless, it rejected every attempt to use
something other than pure total population.
At the state and local level, the Court has been similarly vague
about what the acceptable basis for districting should be. The Court
has used total population per representative as the basis for all of its
decisions, with one exception. In Burns v. Richardson, Hawaii argued
for the use of registered voter population as the basis for its state
districting. 64 The State argued that the large number of transient
military personnel made the total population an inaccurate reflection
of the political realities of Hawaii. 65  The Court accepted this
argument, largely because "the apportionment achieved by use of a
61. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, stated:
The Court's "as nearly as is practicable" formula sweeps a host of questions under the
rug. How great a difference between the populations of various districts within a State
is tolerable? Is the standard an absolute or relative one, and if the latter to what is the
difference in population to be related? Does the number of districts within the State
have any relevance? Is the number of voters or the number of inhabitants controlling?
Is the relevant statistic the greatest disparity between any two districts in the State
or the average departure from the average population per district, or a little of both?
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. For discussions of the best meaning of "one person, one vote," see, for example, Glendon
Schubert & Charles Press, Measuring Malapportionment, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 302, 319-27
(1964); Henry F. Kaiser, A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment, 62
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 208, 208-13 (1968); Bernard N. Grofman & Howard Scarrow, The Riddle of
Apportionment: Equality of What?, 70 NAT'L Cmc REV. 242, 245-53 (1981); Gary Moncrief &
Robert Juola, When the Courts Don't Compute: Mathematics and Floterial Districts in Legislative
Reapportionment Cases, 4 J.L. & POLY 737, 741-50 (1988); Gary F. Moncrief, Floterial Districts,
Reapportionment, and the Puzzle of Representation, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 251, 253-62 (1989).
63. The closest the Court got to such a holding is in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
534 (1969) ('There may be a question whether distribution of congressional seats except
according to total population can ever be permissible under Art. I, § 2.").
64. 384 U.S. 73, 81 (1966).
65. Id. at 94.
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registered voters basis substantially approximated that which would
have appeared had state citizen population been the guide."6
6
The Burns decision seems to be unique to Hawaii. The Court
noted that "[w]e are not to be understood as deciding that the validity
of the registered voters basis as a measure has been established for all
time or circumstances, in Hawaii or elsewhere."67 The Ninth Circuit
rejected a similar argument in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 6
8
arguing that, in fact, the Supreme Court requires total population to
be the basis of districting. 69 So, even if it is not literally mandated,
total population per representative is the generally accepted measure
of representation for districting purposes. 70
Even though the Court has settled on total population per
representative, it is certainly clear that it might have chosen voters
per representative, citizens per representative, or voting age citizens
per representative. 71 It might have chosen to use the quantity of each
constituent's share of a representative, the reciprocal of constituents
per representative, or the reciprocal of any of the others. Its decision
was not foreordained.
Having made the choice of the value to be equated, the Court
still had to decide how to measure the distance from perfect equality.
As discussed above, the Court focuses on the total deviation, but it
could have chosen the average deviation, the standard deviation, the
standard deviation of the percent deviation, and so on.72 Again, none
66. Id. at 96.
67. Id.
68. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991).
69.
Although we are, of course, constrained by the supremacy clause.., to follow
decisions of the Supreme Court on matters of constitutional interpretation, we
emphasize that we do so here not only from constitutional compulsion but also as a
matter of conviction. Adherence to a population standard, rather than one based on
registered voters, is more likely to guarantee that those who cannot or do not cast a
ballot may still have some voice in government.
Id. at 775. But cf. id. at 779 (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part) ("I cannot agree
with the majority's conclusion ... that the district court's reapportionment plan complies with
the one person one vote principle announced by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims.").
70. One explanation for the (near) uniform use of total population is that the data is easily
available to the state and local governments. To use a different basis for local districting would
entail considerable time and effort, and so the local authorities have little incentive to do it. If
the districting is done with respect to total population, it is natural for the Court to work with
that data rather than move to a different standard.
71. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents be Given Extra Votes On Account of Their
Children?: Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
503, 536-65 (2000) (discussing the possibility of giving extra votes to parents on account of their
children); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 1269, 1271-97 (2004) (discussing alternate means of deciding vote distribution).
72. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983).
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of these choices are foreordained although they each reflect a different
notion of the harm produced by unequal districts.
One explanation for the choice of total deviation is the Court's
predominant view that the right to vote is an individual right, as
opposed to a group or systemic one.73 If the harm done by having
districts of different sizes is that a voter in the larger district has less
influence than one in a smaller district, then the citizen of the larger
district can point to the citizen in the smaller district as having undue
influence. If the ideal district serves as the baseline for the "correct"
amount of representation, then those citizens in a district with more
persons per representative have too little representation and those in
a district with fewer persons per representative have too much. The
magnitude of the difference is plausibly captured by the percent
deviation between the two. No average measure is representative of
this individual harm since by definition an average measure takes
into account all of the voters, not just those at the extremes.
In sum, the Court has chosen the total deviation and this
choice is both defensible and consistent with the individualized view of
"one person, one vote."74 That is not to say that the total deviation
measure is the only constitutionally acceptable measure of "one
person, one vote." The Court has toyed with a number of different
measures, and they could all be defended as reasonable. But in order
to provide guidance to state and local governments, the Court had to
choose. 75 And having chosen the measure that it thinks captures the
harm done by having voting districts of differing sizes, the Court
should apply that measure consistently. The next Part examines an
area of representation to which the Court has not applied the total
deviation measure.
73. For a discussion of the Court's approach to "one person, one vote" cases as individual
rights cases and the tension between this view and a systemic one, see Heather Gerken, The
Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1411, 1443-66 (2004), and Richard H. Pildes, Foreward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 101-17 (2004). I will not digress further into a full-fledged
justification of total percent deviation as a measure of some individual right.
74. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 728.
75. The Court might have pursued a different path and given the states a number of
different measures from which to choose. To do this, though, would be to lay bare the fact that
the Court is not sure what it is trying to accomplish with its "one person, one vote" requirement.
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III. APPORTIONMENT
A. The Historical Development
Although Congress has been reapportioning itself every ten
years since its founding,76 the Supreme Court has considered the
mechanisms of apportionment only once. 77 Before discussing the
Court's treatment, some general background on apportionment is
appropriate.
78
After each decennial census, Congress must reapportion the
seats of the House of Representatives "among the several States...
according to their respective Numbers." 79 The Constitution is silent
on how to do this, requiring only that "[t]he Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but
each State shall have at Least one Representative."80
The problem of apportionment amounts to a problem of
rounding. If each state is supposed to get a number of representatives
commensurate with its population, one way to start would be to give
each state the same percentage of representatives in the House as its
population in the United States, i.e., if the state is 10% of the U.S.
population then it should receive 10% of the seats in the House. This
number, referred to as the state's quota, is calculated using the
formula (state population - total population) x total House size. But
the quota is never an integer, and it is impossible to assign a
fractional number of seats. Thus, some states will have to receive
76. Well, not quite. See MICHEL BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION,
MEETING THE IDEAL OF ONE PERSON ONE VOTE 51 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing Congress's inability
to come to an agreement on how to apportion itself after the 1920 census. As a result, it kept the
1911 apportionment until 1932).
77. The Court has considered a number of questions related to how the population is
enumerated for the purposes of apportionment. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 803-06 (1992) (concerning the allocation of overseas federal employees to the states); Dep't
of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 334-44 (1992) (disallowing
statistical sampling for the purposes of apportioning congressional seats); Utah v. Evans, 536
U.S. 452, 473-79 (2002) (allowing the Census Bureaus to use "hot-deck" imputation in its
enumeration for the purposes of apportionment).
78. The history and theory of apportionment is too long and intricate to detail in this
Article. There are a number of sources available for the interested reader to investigate. The
most comprehensive is BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76. Shorter discussions can be found in H.
PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 42-63 (1994); Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna
Sherry, Pick a Number, Any Number: State Representation in Congress after the 2000 Census, 90
CAL. L. REV. 211, 212-16 (2002); U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 448-56
(1992); and Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 245-50 (D. Mass. 1992).
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
80. Id.
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fewer seats than their quota, and some will receive more. The
problem of apportionment is deciding how to allocate them in some
principled manner.
Alexander Hamilton proposed the first method for apportioning
the House after the 1790 census.8' His method begins by rounding
each state's quota down to the nearest whole number.8 2 This results
in too few seats being assigned.8 3 The additional seats are assigned to
states in the order of the size of the fractional part of the quota.8 4 In
other words, after the initial downward rounding, the missing
representatives are added back in, starting with the states whose
rounded number is the furthest from their quota.85 Thus, a state
entitled to 6.9 representatives would originally be assigned 6 seats
and would receive another seat before any state whose quota had a
fractional part less than 0.9. Although Congress adopted Hamilton's
method, George Washington vetoed it.86 Washington believed that the
process of rounding some of the states' quotas up resulted in their
representation exceeding the one for every 30,000 limit.8 7
Congress next turned to a method proposed by Thomas
Jefferson.8 8 Jefferson's method also begins, in essence, by rounding
down the "perfect" number of representatives, but uses a different
method of adding the missing representatives back in.8 9 Instead of
adding them back in directly, according to the size of the fraction that
had been rounded off, Jefferson's method changes the calculation bit
by bit until it yields the desired total number of representatives.90
Here's how it works: the quota of a state can be calculated by the
alternative formula state population - average district size since the
average district size is equal to total population - total House size.91
Jefferson's method was to choose an average district size directly so
that when the resulting quotient state population - average district
size was rounded down for each state, the resulting whole numbers





86. Id. at 20-21
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id.
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completely apportioned the House. 92 Jefferson's method was used by
Congress until 1842.
93
From Jefferson's method grew a number of variations. John
Quincy Adams's method, instead of choosing the average district size
so that rounding down allocates all of the seats, chooses the size so
that rounding up allocates the right number of seats.94 Daniel
Webster's method uses the standard method of rounding, going up if
the fractional part is above .5 and down if it is below.95 There are two
more variations of rounding, one based on the geometric mean, the
Hill method, and one based on the harmonic mean, the Dean
method. 96 Jefferson's method and its variations are generally referred
to as "divisor" methods, because they are based on choosing an
appropriate average district size as a divisor so that the chosen
rounding method fully apportions the House. 97  Together with
Hamilton's method, they are referred to as the standard methods of
apportionment.
At various times, four of the six standard methods have been
employed to apportion the House: the Hamilton, Jefferson, Webster,
and Hill methods. 98 Since the 1930 apportionment, the Hill method 99
has been consistently used. In 1941, Congress designated this method
as the one for all future apportionments. 100
In 1992, Montana challenged the use of the Hill method. 10 1
Montana argued that the Hill method did not achieve the goal of
Article I, §2, which the Court had interpreted to mean that "as nearly
as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
92. Id.
93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 32.
96. Given two numbers, a and b, their geometric mean is equal to N-b and their
harmonic mean is 2aba + b' The Hill method works in the following way: if the quota is between
the whole numbers a and a+1, then round it up if it is above a(a + 1) and down otherwise.
The Dean method rounds up if the quota is above 2a(a + ) and down otherwise.
2a+l1
97. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 61.
98. Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 246-48 (D. Mass. 1992).
99. Named after the chief statistician at the Census Bureau at the time, who, along with
Edward Huntington, a professor of mathematics at Harvard, championed the method. BALINSKI
& YOUNG, supra note 76, at 47. This method is also referred to as the method of equal
proportions. Id. at 157.
100. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006).
101. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 446 (1992).
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worth as much as another's." 10 2 Instead of the Hill method, Montana
said, the Court should order the use of the Dean method. 0 3 That
method, never before used, assigned Montana 2 representatives
instead of 1 (at the expense of the state of Washington, which would
have gone from 9 to 8 representatives). 10 4 Montana claimed that the
Dean method minimizes the absolute deviations from the ideal district
size.105 By absolute deviation, Montana meant the sum over each
state of the difference between the average district size of the state
and the ideal district size.10 6 That is, Montana claimed that if for each
state one took the difference between the average district size and the
ideal district, and then added all 50 of the numbers together, the
result would be smaller when using the Dean apportionment 107 than
when using any other apportionment.10 8 Since the Dean and Hill
102. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
103. James Dean was a professor of astronomy and mathematics at the University of
Vermont. He proposed this method in a letter to Daniel Webster in 1832. BALINSKI & YOUNG,
supra note 76, at 29.
104. Id. There were two other questions involved in this litigation. The government argued
that the choice of method was a political question and could not be challenged. Id. at 459. The
Court found this unpersuasive. Id. Montana also argued that Congress could not delegate to the
Census Bureau the power to reapportion and had to revisit the question itself every ten years.
Id. at 464. This argument was also rejected by the Court. Id. at 465.
105. Id. at 461.
106. Id.
107. I am going to abuse terminology somewhat by referring to the "Dean apportionment"
when I mean the apportionment resulting from the application of the Dean method. Hill
apportionment, Webster apportionment, etc., are similarly defined.
108. Id. This assertion is, in fact, false. It is based on a misunderstanding by both the
litigants and the Court about what the Dean method does. The correct assertion is that the Dean
method produces an apportionment with the property that any transfer of a seat from one state
to another will increase the difference between the average district size of the two states. That,
however, is fundamentally different from being the apportionment that minimizes the absolute
deviation. One can shrink the absolute deviation from the ideal district size while still increasing
the difference between two states.
A small example illustrates that the Dean method may not minimize the overall deviation.
Suppose we have six states, 4 of size 501, 1 of size 2000 and 1 of size 4000, and the size of our
House is 8 seats. The average district size is 1000.5. The Dean method allocates 1 seat to every
state except the one of size 4000 which gets 3. Four of the states have an average district size of
501, one of the states has an average district size of 2000, and the largest state has an average
district size of 1333.3. Overall deviation from the average is 4 x (1000.5 - 501) + (2000 - 1000.5) +
(1333.3 - 1000.5) = 3330.3. It is easy to check that any transfer of a seat from one state to another
will increase the difference between their average district sizes, e.g., if we were to transfer a seat
from the largest state to the next largest, the average district sizes would change to 2000 and
1000 respectively and the difference would increase to 1000 from 666.7. On the other hand, the
apportionment that assigns 2 seats each to the largest states and 1 to the rest has a lower overall
deviation than the Dean method: 4 x (1000.5 - 501) + (1000.5 - 1000) + (2000 - 1000.5) = 2998.
The fact that in this Supreme Court case the transfer of a seat from Washington to Montana
both decreases the difference between the average district sizes of the states and also decreases
the overall difference from the ideal district size is just a coincidence. Montana was thus
correctly arguing that a method other than the Hill method produced an apportionment in this
314
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apportionments agree for every state except Montana and
Washington, the Court focused on computing the differences only for
those two states:
Under the apportionment undertaken according to the Hill Method, the absolute
difference between the population of Montana's single district (803,655) and the ideal
(572,466) is 231,189; the difference between the average Washington district (543,105),
and the ideal is 29,361. Hence, the sum of the differences between the average and the
ideal district size in the two States is 260,550. Under the Dean Method, Montana would
have two districts with an average population of 401,838, representing a deviation from
the ideal of 170,638; Washington would then have eight districts averaging 610,993,
which is a deviation of 38,527 from the ideal district size. The sum of the deviations
from the ideal in the two States would thus be 209,165 under the Dean Method
(harmonic mean) while it is 260,550 under the Hill Method (equal proportions). More
generally, Montana emphasizes that the Dean Method is the best method for
minimizing the absolute deviations from ideal district size. 109
Because the Dean method minimized the absolute deviation
from the ideal district size, Montana argued that it better
approximated "one person, one vote" than did the Hill
apportionment. 110
In response to this claim, the Court reached for its old friend,
the relative deviation from the ideal district size:111
There is some force to the argument that the same historical insights that informed our
construction of Article I, §2, in the context of intrastate districting should apply here as
well.... Yet it is by no means clear that the facts here establish a violation of the
Wesberry standard.... In this case, in contrast [to intrastate districting] the reduction
in the absolute difference between the size of Montana's district and the size of the ideal
district has the effect of increasing the variance in the relative difference between the
ideal and the size of the districts in both Montana and Washington.
1 1 2
In support of this claim the Court provided the following
tables:" 3
instance with a smaller absolute deviation from the ideal district size, but incorrectly suggesting
that the Dean method would always do so.
109. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 460 (1992).
110. Id. at 461.
111. The Court uses the term "relative difference" rather than relative deviation. Id. If there
is any distinction between the two terms it seems to be that when discussing relative difference
the Court does not pay attention to the sign of the deviation, i.e., whether the district is over or
under-represented relative to the ideal district.
112. Id. The Court is mistaken in its last remark. If the absolute difference between
Montana's average district size and the ideal district decreases, then the relative difference
between the average district size and the ideal district size as a percentage of the ideal district
size will necessarily also decrease. The perceptive reader who has caught this will not be
surprised by what is to follow.
113. Id. at 462 n.40.
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Hill Apportionment Average Absolute Relative
District Difference Difference
Size From Ideal From Ideal
Montana 803,655 231,189 40.4%
(1 representative)
Washington 543,105 29,361 5.4%
(9 representatives)
Total Absolute Difference 260,550
Dean Apportionment Average Absolute Relative
District Difference Difference
Size From Ideal From Ideal
Montana 401,828 170,638 42.5%
(2 representatives)
Washington 610,993 38,527 6.7%
(8 representatives)
Total Absolute Difference 209,165
The Court noted that even though the total absolute difference
was smaller for the Dean apportionment than for the Hill
apportionment, 114 the relative difference from the ideal was larger for
both states in the Dean apportionment than in Hill's. 1 5 That is, the
tried-and-true method of looking at relative deviation from the ideal
district indicated that the Hill apportionment was superior. The
Court, then, threw up its hands, proclaiming that "the polestar of
equal representation does not provide sufficient guidance to allow us
to discern a single constitutionally permissible course.11 6 It could not
choose between relative difference and the Hill method, on the one
hand, and absolute difference and the Dean method, on the other.
The Court's analysis is significant in two respects. First, it
again shows that relative deviation is the measure that the Court
believes best captures the harm of malapportionment. Second, it
injected more uncertainty than necessary. The Court could have
chosen measures of disparity that are provably smaller in Hill
apportionments than in Dean apportionments. That is, the Court
could have chosen a different measure of disparity that would have
114. 209,165 versus 260,550. Id. at 461.
115. Id. at 461-62.
116. Id. at 463.
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been guaranteed to make the Hill apportionment look better than the
Dean apportionment. 117 Thus, the Court seemed intent on using
relative deviation even if it unsettled the selection of an
apportionment method. The Court may have even applied relative
deviation precisely because it precluded the selection of any one
apportionment method.
B. The Mathematical Mistake
Either the Court could not select an apportionment method
because it relied on relative deviation, or it relied on relative deviation
because it did not want to select an apportionment method. Whatever
the explanation, the Court's analysis cannot stand. As this Section
demonstrates, the relative deviation analysis contains a mathematical
error. Once corrected, the better apportionment method becomes
clear. Thus, the Court need not avoid the choice nor hide any
reluctance to change behind the analysis.
The values for the relative deviation from the ideal district are
miscalculated. Here are the true values:
Dean Apportionment Hill Apportionment
Relative Difference Relative Difference
from Ideal from Ideal
Montana 29.8% 40.4%
Washington 6.7% 5.1%
Total Deviation 36.5% 45.5%
That is, if calculated correctly, the total deviation is much
smaller for the Dean apportionment than for the Hill apportionment
(about 30% smaller, in fact). The relative deviation for Montana drops
from 40.4% to 29.8% under the Dean method, a 25% reduction, 118
117. Associated with the standard methods of apportionment are statistics of deviation
which they minimize. In the case of the Hill method, had the Court looked at the relative
disparity between the population per representative, where the relative measure is from the
smaller of the two values (as opposed to the ideal district), then the Hill method produces an
apportionment that is always better than the one produced by the Dean method, unless they
happen to coincide. Or they could have computed the sum over all congressional districts of the
square of the difference between the district size and the ideal district. That the latter is also
minimized by the Hill method was noted by Ernst in his affidavit. See infra note 124; see also
BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 104. So the Court knew that there were ways of ensuring
that the Hill method would look better.
118. Which belies the statement of the Court that "[i]n this case, however, whether Montana
has one district or two, its variance from the ideal will exceed 40%." Dep't of Commerce v.
Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 463 (1992).
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although the deviation for Washington increases slightly from 5.1% to
6.7%.
The reader will note that two of these numbers are the same as
those computed by the Court,119 but two are quite different. The
differences occur when the average district size of the state is smaller
than the ideal district. The average district size of Montana under the
Dean apportionment is 401,828,120 which is less than the ideal district
size of 572,466. Washington's average district size under the Hill
apportionment is 543,105,121 again less than the ideal. Thus, when
Washington has 9 representatives and Montana only 1, Washington's
average district size is smaller than the ideal and Montana's is larger.
Transferring one representative from Washington to Montana
reverses that property.
But why do the deviations turn out to be different in these
cases? It is because of the way the calculation was performed for just
these two numbers. The Court's numbers give the deviation as a
percentage of the state's average district size, while the correct
calculation expresses the deviation as a percentage of the ideal district
size.
As an example of the correct calculation, consider the relative
deviation from the ideal district in the case of Montana under the
Dean apportionment. The average district size for Montana with two
representatives is 401,828.122 The ideal district size is 572,466; thus,
the relative deviation from the ideal district size is (401,828 -
572,466)/572,466=-0.298, or 29.8%, below the average district size.
The number that the Court obtained, 42.5%,123 is the relative
difference of the ideal district size from the average district size. The
Court computed the difference as a percentage of Montana's average
district size, not as a percentage of the ideal district size. Algebraically
the computation is (572,466-401,828)/401,828 = .425. Thus, the Court
used the wrong baseline against which to measure the change. The
same thing happened when the Court computed the relative difference
of Washington's average district size under the Hill apportionment.
One might ask how such a significant mathematical error could
have made it into an opinion that is, after all, largely about numbers.
It seems to have been caused by a misunderstanding between one of
the expert witnesses and the Court. Lawrence Ernst, the Assistant
Division Chief of the Statistical Research Division of the Bureau of the
119. See supra table accompanying note 113.
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Census, submitted an affidavit on behalf of the government. 124 In his
affidavit he is careful to indicate that his computation of percentage
differences was always with respect to the smaller quantity. 125 That
is, he always computed the percentage of the smaller quantity by
which the larger quantity exceeded it. To put it differently, Ernst
always chose the smaller number as the baseline and computed the
percentage change from it. So if the state's average district size was
smaller than the ideal size (as Montana's was under Dean and
Washington's was under Hill), his computation was done relative to
the state's average district size rather than relative to the ideal
district. When analyzing the deviation of Montana under the Dean
apportionment, he computed the relative deviation of the ideal district
from the average district size of Montana, not the relative deviation of
the average district size of Montana from the ideal district size.
126
Similarly, under the Hill apportionment, he calculated the relative
deviation of the ideal district size from Washington's average district
size.
The Court somehow assumed that all of the computations of
relative deviation were done relative to the ideal district, which is to
say that the difference between the average district size and the ideal
district was expressed as a percentage of the ideal district size. That,
after all, is how it had always done the computations for evaluating
"one person, one vote," and so it might naturally have assumed that
the expert witness had done the computations that way as well.
127
The numbers that Ernst computed were just transcribed and
mislabeled as being "Relative difference from Ideal."'128 This resulted
in making the Dean method look much less persuasive than it might
have been.
Had the Court computed the numbers correctly, what would it
have done? Although the Court was justified in throwing up its hands
when its favorite method of analysis contradicted the claims of
Montana, it would not have had this easy option had it done the
mathematics correctly. Both absolute deviation (Montana's test) and
total deviation (the Court's usual test) are smaller under the Dean
124. Declaration of Lawrence R. Ernst, Joint Appendix Vol. I at 20, U.S. Dep't of Commerce
v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
125. 'The relative difference between two numbers consists of subtracting the smaller
number from the large number and then dividing the result by the smaller number." Id. at 24.
126. "However, if Montana were to receive a second seat (as it would, for example, using
Dean's method) then the average United States district size would be 42.5% greater than
Montana's average district size of 401,828." Id. at 27.
127. This is further indication that the Court was viewing the apportionment problem as a
variation on "one person, one vote."
128. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 462 n.40.
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apportionment than under the Hill apportionment. The Court might
still have deferred to Congress, but it would have had to justify that
deference.
There is another option, a "polestar of equal representation"
' 129
that can guide the Court through the apportionment dilemma. 130 That
polestar is minimum total deviation. In the next two Parts, I consider
two sets of objections to using minimum total deviation. In the next
Part, I look at three legal arguments against applying minimum total
deviation in the apportionment context. In Part V, I turn to specific
government interests that might justify using the Hill method despite
its failure to satisfy the minimum total deviation criterion.
IV. MINIMUM TOTAL DEVIATION APPORTIONMENT
As demonstrated above, the Court's apportionment precedent is
flawed mathematically. This raises questions about the depth of the
Court's commitment to its current approach. If the Court takes the
time to correct prior errors, it also should reconsider the broader issue
that Montana fairly raised but that bad math obscured: how best to
approximate "one person, one vote." This Part takes a fresh approach
to resolving that question.
Now that we have cleared away the mistakes, we can think
more clearly about how to unify the districting cases with the
apportionment of Congress. The logic is clear: the line of congressional
districting cases from Wesberry to Karcher demonstrates that Article I,
§2 requires congressional district sizes that are "as nearly as
practicable" equal in size. 131 The Court has established total deviation
as the measure of disparity from equal district sizes. The inescapable
conclusion is that Article I, §2 requires the apportionment of Congress
be one that achieves the minimum total deviation, what I will call a
minimum total deviation ("MTD") apportionment.
The beauty of this argument is that it forestalls all of the
haggling about method and replaces it with a test of the
apportionment itself. And that test, the total deviation from the ideal
129. Id. at 463.
130. Again, none of this is to say that the Dean method is the constitutionally required one.
The focus on the method is probably misguided. Instead of picking a method and asking how well
it comports with "one person, one vote," perhaps the Court should start with how it measures
"one person, one vote" and use that to assess the best apportionment. "One person, one vote"
doesn't care about method; it cares about outcomes. Of course, I am assuming that there are no
claims of vote dilution to be made in context of apportionment. If there were, then method might
be considered important.
131. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964).
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district,1 32 is the one that the Court has established for districting
cases and the one that it reflexively turns to when measuring "one
person, one vote." Minimizing total deviation is the "polestar" for
which the Court should have been searching in Department of
Commerce.
There are a number of objections that might be raised to my
proposal. One might argue that apportionment is not governed by the
Wesberry standard of "as nearly as practicable" equal districts, and so
no particular measure of inequality is mandated. Another counter-
argument might be that because of the nature of apportionment there
will necessarily be large deviations, and hence the difference among
possible apportionments will always be de minimis. Finally, one might
think that the issue of apportionment is of sufficient importance and
technical difficulty that Congress should be given deference in
choosing a way to proceed. I will deal with each of these objections in
turn.
A. Wesberry Doesn't Apply to Congressional Apportionment
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 33 the Court ruled that congressional
districts within a state must have "as nearly as practicable" the same
population.134 It based this conclusion on its interpretation of Article I,
§2 of the Constitution. In Department of Commerce, the Court
acknowledged that "[t]here is some force to the argument that the
same historical insights that informed our construction of Article I, §2
in the context of intrastate districting should apply here as well,"135
although it stopped short of explicitly saying that it does. 136 Even
though split on the outcome, the district court panel hearing the case
unanimously agreed that the analysis developed in Wesberry and
Karcher applies to nationwide apportionment. 137
132. Recall that the total deviation is the difference between the largest and smallest percent
deviation from the ideal district size. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Because
congressional districts are single member districts, the apportionment that minimizes total
deviation also minimizes the difference between the largest and smallest districts in absolute
size. As it turns out, the MTD apportionments for both 1990 and 2000 allocate 2 representatives
to Montana.
133. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
134. Id. at 7.
135. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 461 (1992).
136. Nevertheless, the Court went on to say, "[y]et it is by no means clear that the facts here
establish a violation of the Wesberry standard." Id.
137. Montana v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 775 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Mont. 1991)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), reu'd, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
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One inight try to argue that the Wesberry standard does not
apply to congressional apportionment, despite the fact that Wesberry
is based on the only clause in the Constitution that speaks to the
apportionment of the House. 3 8 While such a position is possible, it is
highly implausible. It is inescapable that applying Article I, §2 to
intrastate districting, as was done in Wesberry, is far more of a stretch
than applying it to congressional apportionment. Justice Harlan
observed this in his dissent:
The Court purports to find support for its position in the third paragraph of Art. I, §2,
which provides for the apportionment of Representatives among the States. The
appearance of support in that section derives from the Court's confusion of two issues:
direct election of Representatives within the States and the apportionment of
Representatives among the States. Those issues are distinct, and were separately
treated in the Constitution. The fallacy of the Court's reasoning in this regard is
illustrated by its slide, obscured by intervening discussion..., from the intention of the
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention "that in allocating Congressmen the number
assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's
inhabitants," ... to a "principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise-equal
representation in the House for equal numbers of people." 139
So if the Court was willing to stretch Article I, §2 to apply to intrastate
districting, it surely should apply similar reasoning to interstate
districting.
Moreover, the standard set in Wesberry is never directly
confined to intrastate districting.
While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical
precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making
equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of
Representatives. That is the high standard of justice and common sense which the
Founders set for us. 140
It is difficult to believe that this "fundamental goal" applies within a
state but not between states.
B. De Minimis
Another argument against my proposed unification of
districting and apportionment is that the constitutional requirement
that (1) each state must receive at least one representative and (2)
that all congressional districts must stay within state boundaries,
forces such a large departure from "one person, one vote" that any
additional deviations resulting from the method of apportionment are
138. The clause in question states: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
numbers...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
139. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 26 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
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de minimis. For example, consider the state of Wyoming, with a 2000
census population of 495,304.141 Since it must have at least one
representative, its relative deviation from the ideal district size of
646,952 will be 23.4% under any method of apportionment. Once the
deviation is this large why worry about any additional variation?
"[A]lthough 'common sense' supports a test requiring 'a good faith
effort to achieve precise mathematical equality' within each State ...,
the constraints imposed by Article I, §2, itself make that goal illusory
for the Nation as a whole." 142 Since no apportionment can ever be
close to perfect, Congress should be allowed to choose whichever it
sees fit.
This argument is not sufficient for a number of reasons. First,
it is important to note that Wesberry requires that the districts be "as
nearly as practicable" of equal size-not precisely equal. 143 As noted
subsequently in Kirkpatrick, "[t]he extent to which equality may
practicably be achieved may differ from State to State and from
district to district. ' 144 So the fact that some deviation is unavoidable
in no way vitiates that Article I, §2 permits "only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort
to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown."'
145
And while it is true that no apportionment will ever be perfect,
it is nevertheless the case that the difference in the total deviation can
be considerable. Table II shows different possible apportionments for
the House based on the 2000 census. The total deviation for these
apportionments varies from a high of 111.5% for the Jefferson
apportionment to a low of 46.4% for the Adams apportionment (which
produces, in this case, the MTD apportionment). In particular, the
Hill apportionment, which is the one that is actually used for the
House, has a total deviation of 63.4%. That is, the current
apportionment's total deviation is over a third bigger than the
minimum. If the Court takes the measure of total deviation seriously,
then surely the difference between 63.4% and 46.4% should matter.
141. KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT: CENSUS 2000
BRIEF 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO1-7.pdf.
142. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 463 (1992).
143. 376 U.S. at 7.
144. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
145. Id. at 531.
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Table 11146
State Apportionment Percent Deviation from the ideal district size
Population
Webster/Hill147 Jefferson Adams Dean Hamilton
California 33,930,798 -1.04 -4.64 4.89 0.86 0.86
Texas 20,903,994 0.97 -2.09 4.23 0.97 0.97
New York 19,004,973 1.30 -2.08 4.91 1.30 1.30
Florida 16,028,890 -0.90 -4.71 3.23 -0.90 -0.90
Illinois 12,439,042 1.20 -3.86 1.20 1.20 1.20
Pennsylvania 12,300,670 0.07 -4.93 0.07 0.07 0.07
Ohio 11,374,540 -2.32 -2.32 3.42 -2.32 -2.32
Michigan 9,955,829 2.59 -3.82 2.59 2.59 2.59
New Jersey 8,424,354 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Georgia 8,206,975 -2.42 -2.42 -2.42 -2.42 -2.42
North Carolina 8,067,673 -4.07 -4.07 3.92 3.92 -4.07
Virginia 7,100,702 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
Massachusetts 6,355,568 -1.76 -1.76 -1.76 -1.76 -1.76
Indiana 6,090,782 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61
Washington 5,908,684 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
Tennessee 5,700,037 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10
Missouri 5,606,260 -3.72 -3.72 -3.72 -3.72 -3.72
Wisconsin 5,371,210 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78 3.78
Maryland 5,307,886 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56
Arizona 5,140,683 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67
Minnesota 4,925,670 -4.83 -4.83 -4.83 -4.83 -4.83
Louisiana 4,480,271 -1.07 -1.07 -1.07 -1.07 -1.07
Alabama 4,461,130 -1.49 -1.49 -1.49 -1.49 -1.49
Colorado 4,311,882 -4.79 4.79 -4.79 4.79 -4.79
Kentucky 4,049,431 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32
South Carolina 4,025,061 3.69 3.69 3.69 3.69 3.69
Oklahoma 3,458,819 6.93 6.93 -10.89 6.93 6.93
Oregon 3,428,543 5.99 5.99 -11.67 5.99 5.99
Connecticut 3,409,535 5.40 5.40 -12.16 5.40 5.40
Iowa 2,931,923 -9.36 13.30 -9.36 -9.36 -9.36
Mississippi 2,852,927 10.24 10.24 -11.80 10.24 10.24
Kansas 2,693,824 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.10
Arkansas 2,679,733 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55 3.55
Utah 2,236,714 15.24 15.24 -13.57 -13.57 -13.57
Nevada 2,002,032 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15
New Mexico 1,823,821 -6.03 40.95 -6.03 -6.03 -6.03
West Virginia 1,813,077 -6.58 40.12 -6.58 -6.58 -6.58
Nebraska 1,715,369 -11.62 32.57 -11.62 -11.62 -11.62
Idaho 1,297,274 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Maine 1,277,731 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25 -1.25
New Hampshire 1,238,415 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29 -4.29
Hawaii 1,216,642 -5.97 88.06 -5.97 -5.97 -5.97
Rhode Island 1,049,662 -18.88 62.25 -18.88 -18.88 -18.88
Montana 905,316 39.94 39.94 -30.03 -30.03 39.94
Delaware 785,068 21.35 21.35 -39.33 21.35 21.35
South Dakota 756,874 16.99 16.99 -41.50 16.99 16.99
North Dakota 643,756 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49
Alaska 628,933 -2.79 -2.79 -2.79 -2.79 -2.79
Vermont 609,890 -5.73 -5.73 -5.73 -5.73 -5.73
Wyoming 495,304 -23.44 -23.44 -23.44 -23.44 -23.44
Total Deviation 63.38 111.50 46.42 51.38 63.38
146. MILLS, supra note 141, at 2.
147. For the 2000 census the Webster and Hill methods produce the same apportionment.
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Under Wesberry's reading of Article I, §2, the districts should
have "as nearly as practicable" the same populations. 148 While one
can argue that some deviation is inevitable, it is not clear how to
justify the additional deviation that results from using the Hill
method. Lower courts, when evaluating proposed remedies for
unconstitutional districts, have "often . . . rejected the plan with the
lowest population deviation in favor of plans with slightly higher
deviations that reflected consistent state policies." 149 But it is unclear
what "state policies" are advanced by choosing an apportionment with
a larger total deviation.
C. Deference to Congress
Perhaps the greatest hurdle that my proposal faces is the
inclination to defer to Congress's choice of the Hill method. This issue
was squarely before the Court in Department of Commerce.
The constitutional framework that generated the need for compromise in the
apportionment process must also delegate to Congress a measure of discretion that is
broader than that accorded to the States in the much easier task of determining district
sizes with state borders .... Its apparently good-faith choice of a method of
apportionment of Representatives among the several States "according to their
respective Numbers" commands far more deference than a state districting decision that
is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard. 
15 0
In Department of Commerce, the Court does not directly
address the standard of review that is appropriate for evaluating
Congress's method of apportionment choice. Rather than specify a
particular test, it deferred to Congress on the basis of two related
arguments. 151 The first is that the different measures of deviation
pointed to different choices of method, and so it was not possible to
decide among them. 152 In a later case, the Court described its dilemma
in this way: "Finding that Montana demanded that we choose between
several measures of inequality in order to hold the Wesberry standard
applicable to congressional apportionment decisions, we concluded
148. 376 U.S. at 7.
149. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 741 n.ll (1983).
150. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 464 (1992). The Court was forced to
acknowledge in a footnote that the "apparently good-faith choice" was greatly influenced by
partisan political concerns. Id. at 464 n.42. In 1941, Congress was confronted by the choice
between two different apportionments which differed only on whether the last representative
was to go to Arkansas (a Democratic state) or Michigan (a Republican state). Id. They chose the
apportionment that favored Arkansas in a party line vote (with the exception of the Democratic
representatives from Michigan). Id. They then enshrined the Hill method-the one that assigned
the representative to Arkansas-as the official method of apportionment. Id.
151. Id. at 463-66.
152. Id. at 463.
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that '[n]either mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation
provide[d] a conclusive answer' upon which to base that choice."'153
But, as shown in the previous Part, the Court's confusion was due to a
faulty calculation; there was, in fact, more consistency in the
measures than the Court acknowledged.
The other argument that the Court mustered for deferring to
Congress is that Congress had, over a period of many years, studied
the question diligently, and the results of that deliberation were stable
for many years.154 Thus, there was no reason to reconsider Congress's
work in this area.
The decision to adopt the method of equal proportions was made by Congress after
decades of experience, experimentation, and debate about the substance of the
constitutional requirement. Independent scholars supported both the basic decision to
adopt a regular procedure to be followed after each census and the particular decision to
use the method of equal proportions. For a half century, the results of that method have
been accepted by the States and the Nation. That history supports our conclusion that
Congress had ample power to enact the statutory procedure in 1941 and to apply the
method of equal proportions after the 1990 census. 
1 5 5
The fact that this issue lay dormant for half a century is
irrelevant. The Court's "one person, one vote" jurisprudence began in
the mid-1960s and did not mature until the 1980s. Thus, it is not
surprising the 1990 apportionment was the first one challenged. 156
The relevance of Congress's diligence in evaluating the
methods of apportionment is also questionable. Consider how little
deference the Court gave to the actions of Congress in its decision in
Wesberry. Congress considered requiring equal size congressional
districts beginning in 1842.157 The requirement was implemented in
1872158 and existed until 1911. The requirement of equal districts was
dropped in 1929159 and never revived. The congressional choice to
drop the equipopulous district requirement was deliberate, as Justice
Harlan noted in his dissent:
Although there is little discussion of the reasons for omitting the requirement of equally
populated districts, the fact that such a provision was included in the bill as it was
presented to the House, and was deleted by the House after debate and notice of
intention to do so, leaves no doubt that the omission was deliberate. The likely
explanation for the omission is suggested by a remark on the floor of the House that "the
153. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 14 (1996).
154. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 465-66.
155. Id. at 465.
156. The situation in 1990 was unique in U.S. history, in that every standard method of
apportionment produced a different result, providing numerous incentives to challenge the Hill
method.
157. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 42 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 42-43.
159. Id. at 43.
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States ought to have their own way of making up their apportionment when they know
the number of Congressmen they are going to have."
1 60
Thereafter, there were repeated attempts to reimpose the
requirement, but none were successful. 161 Harlan summarizes the
history:
For a period of about 50 years, therefore, Congress, by repeated legislative act, imposed
on the States the requirement that congressional districts be equal in population. (This,
of course, is the very requirement which the Court now declares to have been
constitutionally required of the States all along without implementing legislation.)
Subsequently, after giving express attention to the problem, Congress eliminated that
requirement, with the intention of permitting the States to find their own solutions.
Since then, despite repeated efforts to obtain congressional action again, Congress has
continued to leave the problem and its solution to the States. It cannot be contended,
therefore, that the Court's decision today fills a gap left by the Congress. On the
contrary, the Court substitutes its own judgment for that of the Congress. 
16 2
The majority opinion in Wesberry cites none of this history and
completely ignores Congress's role in legislating requirements for
congressional districts. Not only is there no consideration of the
amount of deference due Congress on this subject, there is no
acknowledgement that Congress has any role at all.
The parallel between Wesberry and Department of Commerce is
not perfect, but it is persuasive. They both involve interpreting
Article I, §2 in the light of "one person, one vote. ' 163 They both involve
deliberate congressional choices (and, indeed, the suspicion of
improper congressional motive is stronger in Department of
Commerce). Further, both cases ultimately revolve around the
question of the meaning of representation. As such, it is hard to
reconcile the deference given to Congress in Department of Commerce
with the complete disregard for Congress in Wesberry.1 64 This at least
suggests that a more stringent standard of review is appropriate when
evaluating Congress's decisions on apportionment.
The source of much of the confusion for the Court, and hence
the inclination to defer to Congress on the matter, is that the Court
viewed the question before it as, "What is the best method of
apportionment?" If instead of focusing on the method, the Court
evaluates the apportionment itself, as it does in all of the other "one
person, one vote" cases, then the matter is conceptually much cleaner.
Evaluating the apportionment rather than the method is also more
easily justified. As one lower court confronting the same issue noted,
160. Id. at 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
161. Id. at 44.
162. Id. at 45.
163. Id. at 7-8; U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 457 (1992).
164. U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. at 463-66.
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"[W]e can find nothing in the Constitution mandating that a
particular mathematical formula be employed to the exclusion of
others.... [W]e find it difficult to believe that Article I, Section 2
enacted a particular mathematical formula to the exclusion of other
approaches for obtaining equality 'as nearly as is practicable."' 165
Does the apportionment resulting from the use of the Hill
method in any given decade withstand scrutiny in the light of an
alternative apportionment with a much lower total deviation?
Phrased in this fashion, the Hill method will not withstand even a
lower level of scrutiny. That is, the apportionment resulting from the
Hill method in 1990 or 2000 is not constitutional because it fails to be
"as near as practicable" to equal, and thus, the choice of the method is
not "plainly adapted to [a legitimate] end."166 Even if on its face the
Hill method seems reasonable, it is the apportionment that it produces
which is the measure of its constitutionality. The goal is to produce an
apportionment that is as close to equal as possible, and the Hill
method does not accomplish that.
None of the objections outlined here are sufficient to derail my
proposal that apportionment should be governed by the same
principles as congressional districting. That is, choosing an
apportionment other than the MTD apportionment should be enough
to produce a prima facie case for a violation of the "one person, one
vote" standard. That is not the end of the matter, however. The
government has the opportunity to justify its choice of the Hill method
as "necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective."16 7 What
legitimate governmental objectives might warrant the choice of the
Hill method in spite of its larger total deviation? I consider that
question in the next Part.
165. Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 254 (D. Mass. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). In this case, Massachusetts
argued that the Webster method of apportionment was the constitutionally mandated one.
Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. at 253. The Webster method gave one more representative to
Massachusetts and one fewer to Oklahoma. Id. at 234. The lower court found in favor of the
government on the question of the method of apportionment. Id. at 267. However, Massachusetts
prevailed on another issue having to do with how the Census Bureau counted citizens overseas.
Id. That decision was reversed on appeal. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 806. Note, too, that the
Mosbacher court appears to agree that the Wesberry standard of "as nearly as is practicable"
applies to apportionment as well. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. at 249.
166. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819) (describing the rational basis
standard of review).
167. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
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V. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND STATE INTERESTS
The best arguments for the Hill method depend on technical
considerations of the method itself, as well as on a better
understanding of the behavior of the MTD apportionments. I
therefore begin this Part with an explanation of how to find an MTD
apportionment and some of the properties of such apportionments.
Then, I will contrast the MTD apportionments with other methods,
including the Hill method, in an effort to see if the Hill method can be
justified as "necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective."
168
A. The Theory of Minimum Total Deviation Apportionments
I begin by briefly describing how the algorithm that produces
an MTD apportionment works and the circumstances under which
that apportionment is not unique. I will also discuss how to choose
among the MTD apportionments when they are not unique.
Before considering this question, I should note that MTD
apportionment was previously debated. In 1963, before any of the
Court's "one person, one vote" cases, Oscar Burt and Curtis Harris Jr.
argued that a total deviation apportionment would be the fairest way
to allocate seats in the House. 16 9 They gave an algorithm for such an
apportionment and computed it using the 1960 census data.
170
Very shortly thereafter, E. J. Gilbert and J. A. Schatz
responded to Burt and Harris's proposal, attacking it on three
fronts.171 First, they argued that this method of apportionment was
no more fair than any other. 7 2 Second, they gave an example showing
that there may be many different apportionments with the same
minimum total deviation.173 Third, they complained that the
algorithm presented by Burt and Harris was overly complicated, and
they provided a simpler one.174 Although the first criticism might
have been legitimate at the time, the evolution of the Court's "one
person, one vote" jurisprudence makes it incorrect now. Their third
168. Id.
169. Oscar R. Burt & Curtis C. Harris Jr., Apportionment of the U.S. House of
Representatives: A Minimum Range, Integer Solution, Allocation Problem, 11 OPERATIONS RES.
648, 648 (1963).
170. Id. at 649-52.
171. E. J. Gilbert & J. A. Schatz, An Ill-Conceived Proposal for Apportionment of the U. S.
House of Representatives, 12 OPERATIONS RES. 768, 768-69 (1964).
172. Id. at 768.
173. Id. at 769.
174. Id. at 769-70. Somehow this last complaint smacks of "[t]he food is lousy and the
portions are too small."
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critique is valid, and I, in fact, used Gilbert and Schatz's algorithm to
perform the calculations for this Article. The second criticism is the
most troubling from a practical stand point, and I will return to it
later in this Part.
Before turning to the algorithm, it is necessary to clarify how
apportionment works. One way to describe an apportionment is
sequentially, assigning seats one at a time to whichever state is most
deserving. 175 The key is how one decides what "deserving" means.
Suppose we proceed as follows: first assign every state a
representative. Then compute the average district size of each state,
and assign the next representative to the state with the largest
average district size. Recompute the average district size and repeat
this procedure until all of the representatives are assigned. For
example, if we have three states A, B, and C, with populations 50,000,
27,000, and 5,000, then we would begin by assigning one
representative to each state; the resulting average district size for
each state would be 50,000, 27,000, and 5,000 respectively. Now A
has the largest average district size and hence gets the next
representative. With two representatives, A now has an average
district size of 25,000, so the average district sizes are 25,000, 27,000,
and 5,000 respectively. Since B now has the largest average district
size, it would get the next representative, and so on. The resulting
apportionment is the one produced by the Adams method.
17 6
We could measure "deserving" in a different way, however.
Suppose we began not by allocating a representative to each state, but
instead by asking which state would have the largest district size if
given the next representative. In our previous example, we would
assign the first representative to A because if given the first
representative, its average district size is 50,000 and the other two
would have been 27,000 and 5,000 respectively. 177  The second
representative would go to B, since that would make B's average
district size 27,000 and giving it to A or C would have resulted in
average district sizes of 25,000 and 5,000 respectively. The third
175. Each of the divisor methods of apportionment has a description of this form. The
Hamilton method can not be so described. See supra text accompanying notes 81-100 (discussing
the history of apportionment methods).
176. Why this sequential method produces the same result as the rounding method
previously described is complicated. For an explanation, see BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76,
at 142.
177. Note that I am starting from having assigned no representatives to any state as opposed
to the previous paragraph in which I started by assigning one representative to every state. That
is, in the previous example the first three representatives were allocated one each to the states.
In this example, of the first three representatives, two go to A and one goes to B. It is now easier
to see why Jefferson's method favors large states.
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representative would go to A, since A's average district size would be
25,000 and giving it to B or C would have resulted in average district
sizes of 13,500 or 5,000 respectively. This way of assigning
representatives results in the Jefferson apportionment.
The key idea here is that we can describe these apportionments
as a sequential process in which, at each stage, we assess which state
is most "deserving" of the next representative, and the only difference
is in how we define "deserving." We could, in principle, change the
definition in mid-apportionment. The possibility of changing the
meaning of "deserving" is the key to the Gilbert and Schatz method for
computing an MTD apportionment.
The algorithm that Gilbert and Schatz propose 178 is essentially
a blending of the Adams and Jefferson methods. I'll describe how it
works for assigning the 435 seats in the contemporary House of
Representatives; for earlier apportionments, some modifications have
to be made. 179 To assign 435 seats to 50 states, we start with the
Adams method, assigning one representative to each of the states. We
then perform the Adams method 385 times, adding representatives
one at a time to the state with the highest average district size.
For each of those 385 iterations, (except the last one, which
needs no further representatives to be allocated) we stop and change
the method.180 For each iteration, we change to the following: find the
state with the largest average district size and fix its number of
representatives at its current number. The representatives that are
left to be distributed should be distributed to the other 49 states (other
than the state with the current largest average district size) according
to the Jefferson method of assessing "deserving" i.e., the seats are to
be assigned to the state which will have the largest district size if
given the seat.
For example, suppose that after the first 100 seats have been
allocated by the Adams method, New York has the largest average
district size and has been allocated 5 seats. The new apportionment I
produce will permanently fix New York with 5 seats and will allocate
the remaining 335 seats (100 of the 435 seats have already been
distributed) to the states other than New York by following the
Jefferson rule for "deserving."
178. Gilbert & Schatz, supra note 171, at 770-73.
179. In earlier apportionments the size of the House and the number of states differed from
the current numbers of 435 and 50. That affects how the algorithm is described.
180. That is, we allocate the first 51 representatives under the Adams method and then
change methods; then we allocate the first 52 representatives using the Adams method and then
change methods; and so on.
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At the end of this process we will have 385 separate
apportionments-one for each iteration of the Adams method. Many
of them will be the same, but Gilbert and Schatz show that the
apportionment in this list with the smallest total deviation is, in fact,
the apportionment with the smallest total deviation among all
apportionments. 181
Given the close relationship between the MTD apportionment
and the Adams method, it should not be surprising that often the
MTD apportionment is identical to the Adams apportionment. In fact,
the MTD apportionment for 20 of the 22 different apportionments in
American history coincides with the Adams apportionment. The
exceptions are the apportionments from 1810 and 1840.182
These two years are interesting for another reason. Gilbert
and Schatz noticed that the MTD apportionment need not be unique,
and they created an example to demonstrate this by slightly modifying
the data from the 1960 census.18 3 In fact, the MTD apportionments
for 1810 and 1840 are not unique either. In Table III, I have listed all
14 apportionments for the census of 1810 that achieve the smallest
total deviation. For Gilbert and Schatz, the fact that there could be
multiple apportionments with the same minimum total deviation
represents a "major defect,"18 4 but I do not believe that it is an
insuperable problem.
181. Gilbert & Schatz, supra note 171, at 772.
182. This claim is based on my computations of the apportionments. All the computations of
MTD apportionments were done using scripts written for the software package Mathematica.
They are available upon request.
183. Gilbert & Schatz, supra note 171, at 769-70.
184. Id. at 769.
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Table 111185
State Popu- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
lation
New York 953043 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 25 25 25 25
Virginia 817615 22 22 22 23 23 23 22 22 22 23 22 23 23 23
Pennsylvania 809773 22 23 23 22 22 23 22 22 23 22 23 22 23 23
Massachusetts 700745 20 19 20 19 20 19 19 20 19 19 20 20 19 20
North Carolina 487971 14 14 13 14 13 13 14 13 13 13 14 14 14 13
Kentucky 374287 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
South Carolina 336569 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Maryland 335946 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Connecticut 261818 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Tennessee 243913 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
New Jersey 241222 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Ohio 230760 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Vermont 217895 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
New Hampshire 214460 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Georgia 210346 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Rhode Island 76888 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Delaware 71004 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
If there is more than one total deviation apportionment, how
should one choose among them? One easy way would be to choose the
apportionment with the smallest standard deviation from the ideal
district size. This is easy to implement and would be unique. For the
year 1810, the apportionment with the smallest total deviation and
the minimum standard deviation is the fourth one in Table III. This
happens to coincide with the Hill apportionment for 1810.186 While
easy to implement, there is no jurisprudential justification for this
way of singling out one MTD apportionment over another.
Another way to select a particular apportionment from among
a large number of MTD apportionments is by a method known as
lexicographic ordering.187 The MTD apportionments all have the
smallest gap possible between their most over-represented district and
their most under-represented districts. To choose among them, we
could look at the second largest gap between over-represented and
185. The population figures in this table are taken from BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76,
at 159.
186. That this is the Hill apportionment is not so surprising since, in general, the Hill
apportionment minimizes the standard deviation of the size of the districts.
187. GUILLERMO OWEN, GAME THEORY 322 (3d ed. 1995).
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under-represented districts and choose the apportionment that makes
that as small as possible. If more than one MTD apportionment has
the same second smallest gap, we move on to the third, and so on. In
this way, ultimately, we can always pick a unique MTD
apportionment. It is the tenth apportionment in Table III that is the
best apportionment for 1810 under this measure, although one must
check through the seven largest gaps before a unique one is identified.
The idea of ordering the gaps in this way is common in game
theory.1 88  It is also the method that is most fitting, given the
motivation behind the choice of an MTD apportionment in the first
place. The MTD apportionment is meant to minimize the gap between
the district that is most over-represented and the one that is most
under-represented. If two apportionments have that same total
deviation, it is natural to choose between them by looking at the next
largest gap between over- and under-represented districts. This is
what the lexicographic method does.
Yet a third way to choose among MTD apportionments is to
choose the one with the smallest average deviation. This is very much
in the spirit of how average deviation is used in the Court's districting
cases where it can be a supplementary consideration in choosing
among districting plans which all have very small total deviations.
18 9
In the case of the 1810 apportionment, the MTD apportionment with
the smallest average deviation is the fourth apportionment in Table
III. This coincides with the Hamilton apportionment for that year. 190
B. Legitimate State Interests in Apportionment
Having an understanding of how MTD apportionment is
computed and what it might look like, I return to the question of what
legitimate state interests might be furthered by the use of the Hill
method. That is, if Congress were forced to justify its use of a method
that produced a total deviation significantly larger than that of the
MTD apportionment, what justifications could it muster?
Historically, Congress has argued in favor of one method over
another on the basis of the properties of the method rather than on the
188. See id. (using the idea of ordering the gaps to define the nucleolus in a cooperative
game); Gianfranco Gambarelli, Minimax Apportionments, 8 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION
441, 444-59 (1999) (suggesting an application similar to mine, although he focuses on a
somewhat different measure than percent deviation).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35 (discussing de minimis total deviation).
190. This is not a surprise since the Hamilton apportionment always minimizes the average
deviation of an apportionment. It turns out that in 1810, the Hill and the Hamilton
apportionments are identical. See supra note 186 (discussing the Hill apportionment).
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nature of the resulting apportionment. 191 This is in contrast to the
courts which, in "one person, one vote" cases, are mostly concerned
with the districting itself and not the way in which it was produced.
Congress has adopted this stance in large part because it is the way
that experts analyze apportionment. Those who study apportionment
are loathe to choose among methods on the basis of which produces an
apportionment that is closest to "perfect," i.e., the measure of
discrepancy (the so-called objective function) they minimize. Balinski
and Young's comment in this regard is typical: "The choice of an
objective function is, by and large an ad hoc affair... Why choose one
objective function rather than another? Of much deeper significance
than the formulas that are used are the properties they enjoy."'192 Of
course, in our case, the objective function is not ad hoc: it is the one
specified by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, because apportionment methods are generally
studied by identifying certain desirable properties for apportionment
methods, I consider the Hill method in light of these properties. 193 The
relevance of inquiring into the properties of apportionment methods is
that the best case that can be made for endorsing the Hill method for
congressional apportionment is based on the properties that it
exhibits. There are three properties that most practitioners consider
important when evaluating an apportionment method: preserving
quota, bias, and susceptibility to the Alabama paradox. I discuss each
in turn.
1. Preserving Quota
In a perfect apportionment, each state would have the same
percentage of the seats in the House as its percentage of the
population. For example, California's population in 2000 was
33,930,798 out of a total U.S. population of 281,424,177,194 or 12.06%
of the national population. A perfect apportionment of a 435 seat
house, then, would have California receiving 12.06% of the seats, or
52.45 seats. This number of seats is referred to as California's quota.
Table IV lists the quota for each state according to the 2000 census.
An apportionment method is said to satisfy quota if every state
is assigned a number of seats corresponding to its quota rounded up or
191. See supra note 78.
192. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 104.
193. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 582 (2003) (discussing a very similar
approach taken by Arrow in evaluating which method of social choice was the best).
194. See MILLS, supra note 141, at 2 for census data from 2000.
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down to the nearest integer. 195 Checking Table IV reveals that the
current apportionment does satisfy quota, but that the MTD
apportionment (which in this instance corresponds to the Adams
apportionment) does not. California is allotted only 50 seats even
though its quota is 52.45. The allocations for Texas and New York
also break quota, always in a downward direction.
Table IV
State Quota Webster/ Jefferson Adams Dean Hamilton
Hill (MTD)
California 52.44715 53 55 50 52 52
Texas 32.3115 32 33 31 32 32
New York 29.37617 29 30 28 29 29
Florida 24.77601 25 26 24 25 25
Illinois 19.22714 19 20 19 19 19
Pennsylvania 19.01326 19 19 19 19 19
Ohio 17.58173 18 18 17 18 18
Michigan 15.38882 15 16 15 15 15
New Jersey 13.0216 13 13 13 13 13
Georgia 12.6856 13 13 13 13 13
North Carolina 12.47028 13 13 12 12 13
Virginia 10.97562 11 11 11 11 11
Massachusetts 9.823861 10 10 10 10 10
Indiana 9.414579 9 9 9 9 9
Washington 9.133108 9 9 9 9 9
Tennessee 8.810601 9 9 9 9 9
Missouri 8.665649 9 9 9 9 9
Wisconsin 8.30233 8 8 8 8 8
Maryland 8.204449 8 8 8 8 8
Arizona 7.946002 8 8 8 8 8
Minnesota 7.613654 8 7 8 8 8
Louisiana 6.925197 7 7 7 7 7
Alabama 6.895611 7 7 7 7 7
Colorado 6.664917 7 7 7 7 7
Kentucky 6.259244 6 6 6 6 6
South Carolina 6.221575 6 6 6 6 6
Oklahoma 5.346329 5 5 6 5 5
Oregon 5.299531 5 5 6 5 5
195. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 134.
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Connecticut 5.27015 5 5 6 5 5
Iowa 4.531901 5 4 5 5 5
Mississippi 4.409796 4 4 5 4 4
Kansas 4.163869 4 4 4 4 4
Arkansas 4.142089 4 4 4 4 4
Utah 3.45731 3 3 4 4 4
Nevada 3.09456 3 3 3 3 3
New Mexico 2.819097 3 2 3 3 3
West Virginia 2.80249 3 2 3 3 3
Nebraska 2.651462 3 2 3 3 3
Idaho 2.005209 2 2 2 2 2
Maine 1.975001 2 2 2 2 2
New Hampshire 1.91423 2 2 2 2 2
Hawaii 1.880575 2 1 2 2 2
Rhode Island 1.622472 2 1 2 2 2
Montana 1.399355 1 1 2 2 1
Delaware 1.213487 1 1 2 1 1
South Dakota 1.169907 1 1 2 1 1
North Dakota 0.99506 1 1 1 1 1
Alaska 0.972148 1 1 1 1 1
Vermont 0.942713 1 1 1 1 1
Wyoming 0.765596 1 1 1 1 1
How important is it that an apportionment method satisfy
quota? In the 1820 apportionment, New York's quota was 32.503, but
it was assigned 34 seats. In the same year, Pennsylvania's quota was
24.917, but it received 26 seats. In the 1830 apportionment, New York
again violated quota receiving 40 seats even though its quota was only
38.593. So, as a matter of history, the methods employed to apportion
Congress have not always satisfied quota.
On the other hand, these were the only times in history in
which quota was not satisfied. Moreover, the violating of quota in
these two apportionments, a consequence of using the Jefferson
method, probably contributed to the rejection of that method and its
replacement by Hamilton's method, which is known to always satisfy
quota.196
If an MTD apportionment may not satisfy quota, should we
disqualify its use? The answer is no, for several reasons. First, as just
196. Actually the method was proposed by Vinton, but it was identical to that proposed by
Hamilton for the original apportionment of Congress in 1798. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76,
at 37.
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discussed, the historical evidence suggests that violating quota is not a
legal impediment. Second, every standard method of apportionment,
other than Hamilton's method, is known to violate quota under some
circumstances. It is true that the Webster and Hill methods rarely do
so, 197 but the possibility exists nevertheless.
There is a more fundamental issue related to quota, though.
Should we really be concerned with how close a state is to its quota? If
the Court's concern is adherence to "one person, one vote," then the
relevant unit of analysis is the representation of the citizens, not the
total representation of the state. Under this inquiry, then, the state
has no real claim at all.
Further buttressing this argument is the federal statute
requiring states to elect their representatives by single-member
districts. 198 This not only removes from the states the decision of how
to elect the representatives, but ties each representative to a sub-
population of the state, rather than to the state itself. This makes it
difficult to view the representatives as being representative of the
state qua state, rather than as representative of those people within
the district.' 99
One could argue that a state does have a claim to general
representation under Article I, §2. The requirement that
"[riepresentatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
numbers,"200 might be interpreted to mean that the apportionment
must satisfy quota. But there is no "one state, one vote"
jurisprudence, so any rational assignment of seats "according to their
respective numbers" 201 should be sufficient. Violating quota, then,
should not be a constitutional bar.
It might, however, be a political one. One could envision
considerable political fall-out from states receiving less than their
197. In Monte Carlo simulations, the Webster method violates quota about 0.06% of the time
and the Hill method violates quota about 0.3% of the time. In contrast, the Adams and Jefferson
methods almost always violate quota. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 81, tbl. 10.3). Since
the MTD apportionment is often identical to the Adams apportionment, it is highly likely to
violate quota as well.
198. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006).
199. After the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment mandating the popular election of
senators, one might view senators as representing the people of the state rather than the state
itself. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Thus, even the institution that was designed to represent states
qua states has moved in the direction of populism. This is not to say that there are no situations
in which states have a role distinct from their inhabitants. Should a presidential election be
thrown into the House of Representatives, the voting is done by state delegation, with each state
getting one vote. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
201. Id.
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quota. Is satisfying quota a "legitimate state interest"? And, if so, is
the choice of the Hill method "necessary to achieve" it?
The answer to the second question is certainly, "No."
Hamilton's method always satisfies quota, and Webster's method is
less likely to violate quota than Hill's method. 20 2 Even Dean's method
rarely breaks quota. In the 22 apportionments in U.S. history, none of
these methods has ever violated quota. 20 3 Thus, one need not pick Hill
to assure that the quota is satisfied. Moreover, these other methods
will often have less total deviation than a Hill apportionment (as was
the case in 1990).
The answer to the first question is certainly more difficult. It is
hard to know how much political turmoil there would be if an
apportionment violated quota or if it regularly did so. The methods of
apportionment are suitably arcane20 4 that few people are likely to
understand the significance of the quota. On the other hand, if
California were suddenly to lose 3 seats it would be difficult not to
notice. A court could go either way on this question. But even if a
court were to find that satisfying quota is a legitimate state interest,
the Hill method is not necessary to achieve this interest. Rather,
there is an intermediate position requiring the apportionment with
the smallest total deviation that also satisfies quota.
2. Bias
Another property that concerns experts is bias. Suppose we fix
a method of apportionment and look at the resulting seat assignments
over the history of the United States. If we used the Adams method,
we would see that over the course of the 22 apportionments, states
with small populations tended to do better than their quota, and
states with large populations tended to do worse. That is, the Adams
method has a bias toward small states.20 5 If the Jefferson method
were employed, one would see just the opposite: large states would
routinely do better than their quota and small states worse, i.e., a bias
202. See supra note 197 (discussing preservation of quota in different methods).
203. See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 158-180 for a complete table of
apportionments.
204. Something that should be amply clear to the reader who has made it this far.
205. The Adams method is named after its proposer, John Quincy Adams. The bias toward
small states is deliberate since Adams feared the waning power of New England after the 1830
census. He proposed his method as a substitute for one proposed by James Polk, which would
have cost Massachusetts (and New England as a whole) a representative even though the House




toward large states. Of the standard methods, only two are without
bias: Webster's method and Hamilton's method. 20 6
Using a method of apportionment that is systematically biased
is problematic. Jefferson's method, which had been used from the
founding of the nation until 1840, was replaced by Webster's method
largely because of the former's bias toward large states.20 7 The choice
of the Hill method in 1929 was largely based on the (false) assertion
that it was the only method that was unbiased.208 Historically, then,
Congress has been sensitive to bias in apportionment.
Since the MTD apportionment is closely related to the Adams
apportionment, one would suspect that it would be biased toward
small states and that is indeed the case. For this reason, it might be
politically difficult to mandate it as a method of apportionment.
However, two factors suggest that choosing a biased method might be
less politically awkward now than in the past.
The first is that for the last 60 years, the method used has been
biased in favor of small states, and there has been little clamor about
it. The size of the bias in the Hill method is about a third that of the
MTD apportionment 20 9 and so is less noticeable than the MTD
apportionment would be. Nevertheless, there has been little
complaint on this point.
The second factor is that the political situation with respect to
the distribution of population is not as threatening now as it was in
either the 1830s or 1910s. In the 1830s, one saw a dilution of the
traditional political powers in New England;210 the early 1900s saw a
movement away from rural areas and toward the cities. 211 Thus, at
both times, the bias against small states was perceived as
exacerbating an already disturbing trend. It is not a coincidence that
Congress was unable to reapportion itself at all after the 1920 census
given the demographic disruptions and their likely consequences for
reapportionment. 212 It is hard to argue that current demographic
trends are as dislocating as at either of those times, and so a biased
method of apportionment may be of less concern.
206. For a detailed discussion of bias, see id. at Ch. 9.
207. Id. at 34.
208. This was in fact false. As noted earlier, the Hill method is biased towards small states
whereas it is Webster's method which is unbiased. The arguments over this point were quite
vituperative in the 1920s. See id. at 54.
209. Id. at 75, fig. 9.1. I am assuming here that the bias of the MTD apportionment is
essentially the same as the Adams method.
210. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 25.
211. Id. at 51.
212. Id. at 56.
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Indeed, there is some reason to believe that a bias in the
direction of the small states may even be appropriate. With four
states (California, Florida, New York, and Texas) accounting for 32%
of the seats in the House, 213 one might be concerned about too much
concentration of power in the large states. If a small number of states
continue to accumulate seats, and their delegations vote as a bloc,
then the states with large delegations may have too much power in
Congress.
21 4
But even if having a non-biased apportionment is a legitimate
political goal, the Hill method is not necessary to achieve it. The Hill
method is itself biased. The only unbiased methods are Webster and
Hamilton. Hence, the government cannot justify the use of Hill on
this basis. And again, the intermediate position would be to adopt
whichever method achieves the minimum bias together with the
minimum total deviation.
3. Alabama Paradox
As the House of Representatives increased in size, a strange
phenomenon was observed: it was possible that the size of the House
might be increased, but in the process an individual state might lose a
representative solely because of a change in the total size of the
House. For example, after the 1880 census, Congress considered
increasing the size of the House. The Chief Clerk of the Census Office,
using Hamilton's method, computed the apportionment for all sizes of
the House between 275 and 350 seats. He reported to Congress that
[wihile making these calculations I met with the so-called "Alabama" paradox where
Alabama was allotted 8 Representatives out of a total of 299, receiving but 7 when the
total became 300. Such a result as this is to me conclusive proof that the process
employed in obtaining it is defective, and that it does not in fact "apportion
Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers."
2 15
This problem was even more evident in 1900, when Maine would have
been allocated 3 seats if the House was between 350 and 382, 4 seats
if the size was between 383 and 385, back to 3 for House size 386, up
again to 4 for House sizes 387 and 388, back to 3 for sizes 389 and 390,
and finally back to 4 for sizes 391 through 400.216
213. See MILLS, supra note 141, at 2 for census data from 2000.
214. Having control of a large bloc of votes may mean disproportionate ability to affect the
outcome of a vote. See Edelman, supra note 45, at 266 (providing an example of one such
scenario); Felsenthal & Machover, supra note 45, § 7.8 (discussing the bloc paradox).
215. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 38 (quoting a letter written by C.W. Seaton).
216. Id. at 40. A representative from Maine bemoaned these results on the floor of the House
crying, "[iun Maine comes and out Maine goes... God help the State of Maine when mathematics
reach for her and undertake to strike her down." Id. at 41.
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All of the divisor methods avoid the Alabama Paradox; so,
among the standard methods, it afflicts only Hamilton's. At this time,
I have no conclusive proof as to whether an MTD apportionment could
be subject to the paradox. To my knowledge, the paradox only
manifests itself when the MTD apportionment is not unique. In those
cases, there always seems to be a way to choose among the many MTD
apportionments so as to avoid the paradox. But no mathematical
proof of this assertion is available.
217
Frankly, it is no longer clear how significant the Alabama
Paradox is. The House of Representatives has not changed size since
1911,218 and there seems no real pressure to do so. The most likely
scenario in which the House would increase in size would be the
addition of either Washington, D.C. or Puerto Rico as a state; then,
perhaps, the House would add 2 seats to accommodate them. Using
data from the 2000 census, I have verified that the MTD
apportionment would not exhibit the Alabama Paradox if Congress
were to add as many as 10 seats to the House.
Choosing a method to avoid the Alabama Paradox might be a
legitimate political goal, although it seems irrelevant for the
foreseeable future. But, again, even if it is legitimate, the choice of the
Hill method is unnecessary to achieve it. Any method other than
Hamilton's will suffice. Other solutions present themselves as well.
For example, one solution would be ensuring by statute that if the
House is to be increased in size that no state would have fewer
representatives than it currently has.
In short, the government cannot muster a strong claim that the
choice of the Hill method is necessary to further some legitimate
political goal. There are numerous alternatives to Hill that would
further the same goals, and many of them would result in smaller
total deviations.
On the other hand, the result might not be the triumph of the
MTD apportionment. The Court might accept preservation of quota or
lack of bias as legitimate political goals. If so, the MTD
apportionment would not be appropriate, and some mixed regime of
217. For a more detailed technical discussion of this issue, see Paul H. Edelman, Minimum
Total Deviation Apportionments (forthcoming 2006).
218. This is not quite true. When Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the union in 1959, the
House increased to 437 seats by adding one each for the new states. After the 1960
reapportionment, however, it returned to its original 435. U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional
Apportionment-Historical Perspective, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/
apportionment/history.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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choosing the standard apportionment with the smallest total deviation
might be substituted in its stead.
219
VI. CONSEQUENCES
If the Court were to hold that an MTD apportionment was
constitutionally mandated, what difference would it make? Table V
shows what the 2002 Congress would look like under such an
apportionment:220
Table V
State Apportionment Minimum Total Current
Population Deviation Apportionment
California 33,930,798 50 53
Texas 20,903,994 31 32
New York 19,004,973 28 29
Florida 16,028,890 24 25
Illinois 12,439,042 19 19
Pennsylvania 12,300,670 19 19
Ohio 11,374,540 17 18
Michigan 9,955,829 15 15
New Jersey 8,424,354 13 13
Georgia 8,206,975 13 13
North Carolina 8,067,673 12 13
Virginia 7,100,702 11 11
Massachusetts 6,355,568 10 10
Indiana 6,090,782 9 9
Washington 5,908,684 9 9
Tennessee 5,700,037 9 9
Missouri 5,606,260 9 9
Wisconsin 5,371,210 8 8
Maryland 5,307,886 8 8
Arizona 5,140,683 8 8
Minnesota 4,925,670 8 8
Louisiana 4,480,271 7 7
Alabama 4,461,130 7 7
Colorado 4,311,882 7 7
219. There is some precedent for choosing among a number of different methods. In 1941,
Congress ordered the Census Bureau to compute the apportionment for the 1940 census using
both Webster's method and Hill's method. BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 57-58.
220. See MILLS, supra note 141, at 2 for 2000 census data on apportionment populations.
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Kentucky 4,049,431 6 6
South Carolina 4,025,061 6 6
Oklahoma 3,458,819 6 5
Oregon 3,428,543 6 5
Connecticut 3,409,535 6 5
Iowa 2,931,923 5 5
Mississippi 2,852,927 5 4
Kansas 2,693,824 4 4
Arkansas 2,679,733 4 4
Utah 2,236,714 4 3
Nevada 2,002,032 3 3
New Mexico 1,823,821 3 3
West Virginia 1,813,077 3 3
Nebraska 1,715,369 3 3
Idaho 1,297,274 2 2
Maine 1,277,731 2 2
New Hampshire 1,238,415 2 2
Hawaii 1,216,642 2 2
Rhode Island 1,049,662 2 2
Montana 905,316 2 1
Delaware 785,068 2 1
South Dakota 756,874 2 1
North Dakota 643,756 1 1
Alaska 628,933 1 1
Vermont 609,890 1 1
Wyoming 495,304 1 1
Total Population 247,493,379 435 435
As is readily apparent, the largest states lose the most under
an MTD apportionment. California loses 3 representatives, while
Texas, New York, and Florida lose 1 each. The two other states losing
representation are Ohio and North Carolina. The states that gain a
representative are Oklahoma, Oregon, Connecticut, Mississippi, Utah,
Montana, Delaware, and South Dakota. Overall, there is a transfer of
representation from larger states to smaller ones.
This transfer of representatives from big to small states is not
surprising given the fact that, in this instance, the MTD
apportionment is equivalent to the Adams apportionment. As
previously discussed, it is well-known that the Adams apportionment
has a bias in favor of small states. On the other hand, not all MTD
apportionments agree with Adams. The Adams apportionment for the
1810 Congress has a total deviation three times that of the MTD
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apportionments. The nature of the overall bias of an MTD
apportionment remains an open problem.
One might wonder what effect a change in apportionment
would have had on the two most recent presidential elections. Since
the electoral vote of a state is two more than its congressional
delegation, a change in the apportionment would likely change the
electoral vote totals. If the MTD apportionment had been used in
2000, then the 2004 presidential race would have resulted with Bush
receiving 1 more electoral vote. The 2000 election (which depended on
the 1990 census) would have resulted in Bush gaining 3 electoral
votes. In other words, it would not have changed the outcome in
either election.
Similar results follow from other close presidential elections in
American history: 1876,221 1888,222 and 1960.223 The change to an
MTD apportionment would not have affected the outcome in any of
these elections. At most, 4 electoral votes would have changed sides in
any of these elections. 224 Evidently, the proposed change to an MTD
apportionment would make little difference on presidential outcomes.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that the Court's "one person, one
vote" jurisprudence has implications for the method by which the
House of Representatives is apportioned. If the Court were to reason
consistently about measuring deviations in representation, then it
would be forced to throw out the current method of apportionment.
The Court itself had a sense that this was true when deciding
Department of Commerce v. Montana, but it was diverted by, of all
things, an arithmetic mistake.
In 2010, the House will again be reapportioned, and possibly,
the Court will have a chance to review its earlier decision. Perhaps it
221. Hayes beat Tilden in this election after a special commission allocated disputed
electoral votes, despite the fact that Tilden won the popular vote. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 at 99-105 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2004).
222. Harrison beat Cleveland in one of the three elections in history for which the popular
vote gave a different outcome than the electoral vote. JAMES T. HAVEL, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTIONS: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL GUIDE 64 (1996).
223. Kennedy beat Nixon in another close popular election. See Robert S. Erikson, The 2000
Presidential Election in Historical Perspective, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 29, 31-32 (2001) (comparing the
1960 election to the 2000 presidential election).
224. Nixon would have received four more electoral votes and Kennedy four fewer in the
1960 election, making the election somewhat closer. In 1876, Hayes would have gotten two more
electoral votes, and Harrison, in 1888, would have gotten one more, in both cases extending their
leads.
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will take the opportunity to reconcile its measure of representation
and its treatment of apportionment. This Article has shown the Court
how to do so.
